So, orpheus has offered to explain/debate philosophy (except for Ayn Rand) with any and all. I happen to know he kicks major amounts of ass in this arena, so if anyone's got questions, bring it on!

Reposts from another thread:

orpheus wrote:

Okay...I am convinced....women in lingerie in the kitchen (isn't that akin to the Platonic Form of Beauty Itself?).

Who wants to discuss the finer points of Aristotelian ethics? Maybe I post a little something to get the conversation going...I wrote this with non-academics in mind....

    Virtue translates the Greek arete, which in the NE refers to a functional excellence (1106a17). Arete is an hexis; an habit of response established in the individual character (1106a12). A virtuous disposition, i.e. a proneness toward excellence in moral conduct, is acquired through the repeated performance of appropriate activity. Excellence of function requires the avoidance of inappropriate responses to stimuli. Thus virtue seeks the mean between excessive and deficient response (1106b27). The mean regards human emotion and action (1106b17). As the appropriate response, the mean is “defined by a rational principle, such as a prudent man would use to determine it” (1107a1). Phronesis, i.e. practical wisdom, is required to direct action “toward the right objects, at the right time, toward the right people, for the right reason, in the right manner” (1106b20). The mean is not simply the midpoint between extremes, rather it is relative to the character of the individual and the particular situation which prompted the individual to respond with emotion or action. For each moral situation there is only one response which is appropriate for each individual. This response is at once an excellence in conduct and a mean between extremes. Virtue is not a proneness to mediocrity, it is the full flourishing of proper human function relative to the contingencies of the individual (1107a6).
    According to Aristotle, there are three common causes of moral error in regards to the proper emotional response to morally significant phenomena. The first is poor habituation; if a girl is “not brought up to feel pleasure and pain in the proper things” her capacity for proper feeling may be irreparably damaged. Corrupt habituation may become incorrigible, and may only be addressed through enforced alteration of response (via sanction or strength of will). The second error is the result of ignorance. One may have false beliefs concerning the particulars of a situation, causing her to respond improperly. This error can be addressed simply by being made aware of the truth. Finally, error may be due to lack of practical wisdom, and may be addressed by appeal to someone more prudent.
    Can this ethical system adequately account for emotions such as anger? Aristotle calls the virtue with respect to anger mildness (praotes) which is the mean between the excesses of apathy and short-temper. He defines anger as “an impulse, accompanied by a pain, to a conspicuous slight directed without justification towards what concerns oneself…always felt towards some individual”(Rhet.1378a32).  The emotion manifests certain components. First, there is the pain, or physical affect. Then, the standard of what is important and valuable. Thirdly, the perception that something valued has been damaged, slighted or treated unjustly. I will test the adequacy of this virtue theory by way of the following example.
    Meno has just been told that Zeno has harmed his son. This stimulus provokes a feeling of anger, immediate pain at the thought of something valuable to him being harmed. Meno’s moral disposition causes an impulse to grab his spear and seek out Zeno. His rational judgement assents to the course of action based on the belief that Zeno s a cad, his source of information is honest and accurate, and the law of Athens justifies such action. Finally, he acts, killing Zeno.

There are many points in this decision process for error. His initial feeling of anger may be helplessly flawed by sufficiently poor upbringing. For example, if Meno were one of Plato’s Auxiliaries he would be apathetic to reports of harm to ‘his’ son (Pol.1262b15). Next, the initial impulse arising out of his character may be vicious. In the virtuous man, the immediate impulse triggered by emotion will concur perfectly with the rational judgement of the prudent man. Then, his perception of the situation could be in error (e.g. his son was not really harmed, or was harmed by someone else). Meno could be lacking in prudence, thereby assenting to improper impulses, or over-riding proper impulse due to a mistaken conception of right action (e.g. Stoic apathy).
    The moral agent comes into any situation with a certain character as the result of prior habituation and education. He thus has a disposition in regards to various emotions. A situation occurs. The agent is affected based on a set of value beliefs, and his perception of the occurrence. His perception is affected by how his character is disposed to the emotions, for it precisely the emotions which alert the agent to the moral import of the occurrence. The emotions respond to the occurrence with a feeling of pleasure or pain, and motivate the agent toward some end. He must then bring reason to bear upon that end, either affirming or denying its appropriateness, and then, if appropriate, deliberating a possible means to that end. A choice is then made, and action initiated.
    It seems Aristotle’s theory of virtue can adequately encompass dispositions toward emotion if one is willing to accept certain premises. First, improper education and upbringing can render some incapable of virtue (e.g. the vulgar laborers in the Politics). Second, that emotional impulses can be rationally self-assessed prior to action (e.g. self-reflective moment of decision between the painful anguish and the outpouring of tears and lamentations). Thirdly, that there are at least some accessible wise men with knowledge of proper human conduct. And finally, that the repetition of prudent action in conflict against improper emotional impulses will serve to moderate and alter such impulses.
    It also appears that moral virtues are the perfection of proper response to emotional stimuli. They are required to properly assess morally significant situations. Poorly developed passions result in distorted perception of moral phenomenon.  Good character enables the agent to be ‘affected’ properly. Moral strength is needed to correct misperceptions caused by poor inculcation of character. Habitual correction should result in the eventual attainment of virtue. Finally, the virtuous man will respond by his emotions urging him to proper ends, and his practical wisdom determining the best means.

Yasha wrote:

With all of that in mind, doesn't that mean that in each society, all virtuous men would react roughly the same way to the same things? The societal difference seems to be the only difference in reaction, because different societies would create different definitions of what was prudent. I seem to recall you saying that Aristotle's virtues were not relativistic-- does this mean that by Aristotle's view, entire societies could be lacking in virtue?

(also, maybe we should make a new thread for this...)

Edit: Ahahaha, that avatar even looks like you

orpheus wrote:

...start a new philosophy thread and I will explain whatever philosophical theories you care to investigate (except Ayn Rand).

As for moral relativity, Aristotle is trying to bridge the gap between universal human nature and radically different cultural frameworks. WHAT is morally good is universally grounded in the shared horizons of human flourishing, HOW moral goodness manifests depends on cultural context (gender, political affiliation, language, etc).

satyreyes wrote:

morosemocha wrote:

^ ^ ^ ^ Yeah, okay, now can someone translate that into stupid-ese for me?

Sure!

Virtue is moderation.  When a virtuous man's emotions are aroused, they arouse him to the moderate course of action.  You can also have a nonvirtuous man whose emotions would lead him to extremes, but whose "moral strength" is great enough to bring the man's actions in line with moderation.  You become virtuous by exercising this "moral strength" until, over time, your emotions align with moderation.  In other words, fake it till you make it.

Whaddayasay, prof?  Do I get an A?  Or do I get points off for not mentioning what happens when the agent doesn't have his facts straight?

orpheus wrote:

"fake it until you make it"...lol...nice.

Consider, by analogy, learning to speak french. You learn by making french-like noises, without any sense that what you are saying is correct. You just keep mimicking the noises, and eventually, you develop a sense of speaking-french.
With virtue, we all have the ability to develop our emotions into virtuous motivations, but rarely ever have the commitment to become virtuous. Thus we can know what is morally, but not do it, because we have not trained our emotions to 'want' to be moral.
We become just by acting justly when we are not.

And for specifically Nietszche, check in here!